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THE ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT
BETWEEN CANADA AND ASEAN: CHARTING
A FOREIGN INVESTMENT COURSE IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA
I. INTRODUCTION
In September i98i Canada and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) signed the first economic co-operation agreement
between ASEAN and an individual country.' The Agreement is in-
dicative of the changing focus in Canadian international economic
relations towards the Pacific area. It also underlines Canadian rec-
ognition of an important new regional organization whose member
countries contain some of the world's fastest growing economies. In
this discussion it is proposed to examine the Agreement against the
international legal framework for economic relations between states,
assess its overall effectiveness in that context and explore where new
initiatives are still needed.
II. ASEAN
ASEAN consists of six Southeast Asian countries: Thailand, Ma-
laysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei. These
countries have a population of over 270 million and a Gross Domes-
tic Product around U.S. $2oo billion. During the 1970S the ASEAN
countries were the fastest growing in the world with growth rates
between six and nine per cent - compared with Canada's 3-9- It is
the potential that this continued growth, or even something close to it,
represents for Canadian trade and investment in the region that
forms the political and economic background to the Agreement.
ASEAN was founded in August 1967 as a political grouping with
the aim of maintaining peace and security in the region.2 Between
1967 and 1975 it was a relatively inactive body. This period of
1 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Governments of the
Member Countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations on Eco-
nomic Cooperation, New York, 25 September I98i; in force I June 1982
(hereinafter called "the Agreement?').
2 See Text of Asean Declaration Signed by the Five Asean Countries in
Bangkok on 8 August 1967, in D. Crone, THE ASEAN STATES : COPING WITH
DEPENDENCE (1983) Appendix A.
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atrophy (which coincided with the Vietnam war and its aftermath)
ended in 1976.
At the first meeting of ASEAN heads of government on Bali in
1976, two important agreements were signed: the Treaty of Amity
and Co-operation in South East Asia (open to accession by other
countries in the region) and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord,
which undertook an expansion of economic, social, political and cul-
tural co-operation amongst members.'
Co-operation between ASEAN countries on political matters has
been matched by economic and legal co-operation as well. In 1977
ASEAN members signed the Preferential Trading Arrangement
(PTA) whereby they agreed that tariff preferences negotiated on a
multilateral or bilateral premise between themselves be extended to
all ASEAN states on a most-favoured-nation basis.' The ASEAN
Committee on Trade and Tourism is to conduct trade negotiations
within the framework of the PTA. The PTA only applies to trade
in goods between ASEAN countries. The presence of a country like
Singapore, with few tariffs, makes concessions granted by other
ASEAN members less meaningful.
An ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures Agreement was set up in
1983. Under its terms, private investors from at least two ASEAN
nations may invest in a joint venture within ASEAN. If a project
meets with ASEAN approval the exports of the joint venture will be
entitled to a fifty per cent reduction in tariffs by participating im-
porting countries. There have been other attempts to co-ordinate
economic developments between ASEAN members, such as the
ASEAN Industrial Projects and the ASEAN Industrial Comple-
mentation Projects. Progress under these umbrella agreements has
been spotty with some projects being dropped and others proceed-
ing. The Agreement, in Article VIII, specifically refers to the pos-
sibility of Canadian participation in such regional projects.
3 See Text of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and
Text of the Declaration of Asean Concord Signed by the Five Asean Heads
of States in Bali on 24 February 1976, id., Appendices C and B.
4 See Text of the Asean Preferential Trading Arrangements signed by the
Five ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Manila on 25 February i977, id., Appen-
dix D; Tan, Intra-ASEAN Trade Liberalization: An Empirical Analysis
(1982) 20 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD. 321. The PTA was facilitated by a
GATT waiver pursuant to the Protocol relating to Trade Negotiations among
Developing Countries: see GATT, ,8th Supp. BISD 26 (97).
5 See M. Ar-if, The Development of the ASEAN Industrial Projects: Studies
on Regional Co-operation in the Fields of Industry, I.D./U.N.I.D.O./I.S./
281, 25 January 1982.
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There have been several attempts within ASEAN to establish uni-
form laws on certain matters besides tariffs. A committee has been
established to examine national tax incentives and to examine means
of rationalizing the present system. The ASEAN Society of Accoun-
tants is attempting to develop common accounting standards for the
countries of the region. In 1979, the ASEAN Group of Experts
proposed a uniform ASEAN law on patents.'
III. THE AGREEMENT
The history of the present Agreement began in 1976 with the
formation of the ASEAN-Ottawa Committee. The Philippines was
the country designated by ASEAN to co-ordinate relations between
that organization and Canada. The Philippines also co-ordinates the
ASEAN-U.S. relationship. Under the aegis of the ASEAN-Ottawa
Committee meetings were held which have led to economic develop-
ment assistance in the form of two major development projects?
The Committee also provided Canada with the status of an ASEAN
dialogue partner thus enabling it to participate in the annual post-
ministerial meetings of ASEAN foreign ministers. The other ASEAN
dialogue partners are Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the EEC and
the United States. In I98O the Secretary of State for External Af-
fairs, the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, suggested that Canada
and ASEAN conclude an industrial and technical co-operation
agreement. In the discussions which followed, the scope of the
Agreement was expanded to include co-operation in commercial
matters. The outcome of these negotiations was the 1981 Agreement.
The Agreement is characterized by its high level of generality. The
Agreement does not contain detailed provisions on specific aspects
of Canada-ASEAN economic relations. This reflects the fact that
this relationship has little historical content. Though several ASEAN
countries are members of the Commonwealth, Canada has no history
of playing an active role in Southeast Asian affairs. The new Agree-
ment represents an expectation of greater economic involvement in
the future. Meanwhile, uncertainty as to the form such involvement
might take partly explains the vague language of the Agreement.
6 See D. Allan, A. Farran and M. Hiscock, Institutional Co-operation in Asia
and the Pacific. Paper delivered to i ith International Trade Law Seminar,
Australian Academy of Science, Canberra, November, 1984.
7 These projects were a Forest Tree Seed Centre and the Fisheries Post-
Harvest Technology Project. See Note, (1982) 20 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 347.
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The Agreement consists of five parts. Part One relates to industrial
co-operation and, consistent with the facilitative nature of the whole
arrangement, avoids specific undertakings in exchange for mutual
pledges to work towards new bilateral and inter-agency agreements,
as well as joint ventures and technology transfers. The initial focus
of the Agreement is on expanding both public and private invest-
ment rather than trade opportunities. Part Two deals with commer-
cial co-operation and contains a most-favoured-nation standard
(Article V) for products of the parties. The development needs of
the ASEAN countries are also recognized in terms of a reference to
market access in Article VIII. Part Three is the last substantive part
of the Agreement and deals with development co-operation and
contains undertakings by Canada to co-operate on ASEAN regional
development projects as well as consider providing technical and
financial support. Part Four deals with related agreements and in-
stitutional arrangements. Under Article XVII of the Agreement, a
Joint Co-operation Committee is established to promote and review
the various co-operation activities envisaged under the Agreement
The Committee is to meet annually. In addition, the parties are
obliged to consult, upon request, on individual subjects."0 Part Five
of the Agreement deals with the territorial application of the Agree-
ment, its duration and amendment procedures."
IV. THE BACKGROUND TO THE AGREEMENT
The general language of the recent Agreement can only be as-
sessed against the economic relations between Canada and the
ASEAN nations, as well as the international legal framework in the
context of which those relations evolve. While Canadian trade policy
appears to favour an increased level of trade and investment with
the countries of ASEAN this has yet to be realized. Canada's exports
to ASEAN countries have declined in terms of its competitors (such
as Australia and the United States) in that market. The need of the
countries in the region for capital, technology and goods seems to
present Canada with considerable potential for expansion. Con-
versely, ASEAN economic development will continue to be ham-
pered if developed countries, like Canada, close off their markets
8 Supra, note i, Articles IX and X.
9 Id., Article XVII.2.
I' Id., Article XVI.
II Id., Articles XVIII-XX.
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to competitively priced products from ASEAN countries.1 2 In terms
of foreign investment Canada has also not played a major role in
Southeast Asia but, given local growth rates, there is obvious scope
for expansion.
Canada, along with all of the ASEAN nations, except Brunei, is a
member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)."
With respect to trade in goods, the GATT obligations of the parties
to the Agreement far outweigh those under the Agreement itself.
The most-favoured-nation article (Article V) is somewhat ambig-
uous but appears merely to restate its obligation in terms of treat-
ment already provided for under GATT or any bilateral agreement
in force between Canada and a non-GATT member of ASEAN. 4
In other words, the Agreement does not appear to state a separate
most-favoured-nation standard outside those already provided for in
other treaties. The fact that the Agreement focuses on investment,
rather than trade, is not surprising given the recent major multi-
lateral developments regarding trade law and policy.'"
International regulation of investment is, unlike trade, relatively
undeveloped. There are no generally recognized restrictions at cus-
tomary international law on the ability of a state to restrict the
entry of foreign investment. This is often referred to as the absence
of a "right of establishment",' 6 In the face of this void many states,
including the parties to the Agreement, have laws which confer a
generous degree of administrative discretion as to the entry of
foreign business.
In the remainder of this discussion, various forms of international
agreement relating to foreign investment will be outlined. After an
unsuccessful attempt at multilateral accord in the period immediately
after the Second World War, the modern trend of international
practice has been to deal with investment on a bilateral level and
several specialized forms of agreement have emerged.
13 See F. Stone, CANADA, THE GATT AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE SYSTEM
(1984), at 77. The author notes that ASEAN is not an attempt to establish a
free-trade area or customs union under the GATT.
14 Prior to Thailand and the Philippines acceding to the GATT, they signed
trade agreements with Canada in 1969 and 1972 respectively; see [1969]
C.T.S. , and [1972] C.T.S. 28.
Is See Hon. D. S. Macdonald, The Multilateral Trade Negotiations- A Law-
yer's Perspective (1979-8o) 4 CAN. BUS. L.J. 139.
36 See L. Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1955), at 689-9o and Z. Kron-
fol, PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT (3972).
2 See D. Lecraw and K. Hay, Canada's Economic Relations with the Coun-
tries of ASEAN, to be published in Canada and International Trade (Curtis
and Haglund eds. 1985), vol. 2.
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V. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE AND FOREIGN
INVESTMENT
A. THE HAVANA CHARTER
The Charter of the proposed International Trade Organization
(ITO) which was considered at the Havana Conference of 1947-48
recognized that states had the right to determine whether and on
what terms foreign investment should be allowed." The Charter was
never operative but under Article XXIX of the GATT, the right of
establishment contained in the ITO Charter must be recognized by
the Contracting Parties to the full extent of their executive author-
ity. 8 These provisions were recently considered by a GATT Panel
in a case involving allegations by the United States that certain
undertakings required of foreign investors into Canada were in vio-
lation of the GATT.'9 The Panel noted that not only had the pro-
visions of the ITO Charter never entered into force but that Article
XXIX had almost been deleted from the GATT in 1955. In the
view of the Panel, the ITO Charter provisions could be seen as
compatible with increased international co-operation to facilitate
the reduction of barriers to foreign investment.
B. FCN TREATIES
The most common international agreement concerning foreign
investment is probably the form of treaty known as the treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN Treaty). Canada is
party to several FCN treaties, either in its own right or as a con-
sequence of agreements negotiated by Great Britain in the period
before Canada assumed full responsibility for its foreign relations.
These instruments are akin to the ASEAN agreement insofar as
they are designed to be long-term and embody basic principles of an
economic relationship. Characteristically, FCN treaties deal with the
mutual protection of persons and property and establish certain
standards.2" Unlike more recent economic accords, FCN treaties
17 Final Act and Related Documents, United Nations Conference on Trade
and Employment, Havana, Cuba, 21 November 1947 to 24 March 1948,
U.N. Doc. ICITO/II 4 (1948), Article 12.
Is GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, vol. 4.
19 Canada Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, GATT Panel
Report, L/ 5 5o4, 25 July 1983 and see R. Paterson, The GATT and Restric-
tions on Foreign Investment: The United States Challenge to Canada's
Foreign Investment Law (1982) 1 U.C.L.A. PACIFIC BASIN L.J. 224.
20 See H. Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
(1958) 42 MINN. L. REv. 805.
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focus on political, as well as economic, aspects of bilateral relation-
ships. Like these more contemporary agreements, however, they are
multipurpose and designed to establish a broad base for an ongoing
relationship that may take varying forms.
Two provisions are typical of FON treaties and consistent with
their level of generality - the 'most-favoured-nation' clause and the
'national treatment' clause. Both are standards of non-discrimina-
tion. The former guarantees treatment equal to that extended to
other foreigners. The latter measures discrimination domestically
and promises treatment of foreigners equal to that afforded citizens.
A good deal of legal uncertainty attends such provisions. In the first
place, it is often not clear whether either obligation is conditional or
unconditional - that is, does it depend on whether the other party
granted it freely." Secondly, since such treaty obligations only bind
Canada internationally and are not part of her domestic law, they
may not square with many discriminatory rules forming part of that
law.
The FON treaty is now regarded as a dated tool for the regulation
and protection of international investment. The provisions of FCN
treaties are often inappropriate for new forms of investment and the
contemporary needs of investors. In the case of the ASEAN countries
their needs will vary with the state of development of the country
concerned. In some less developed countries the focus may be on
domestic processing of local products and the development of im-
port-substituting manufacturing industries. In other more developed
countries, the emphasis may be on the establishment of distribution
facilities and licencing agrements. Since the FCN treaties were
drafted, new concerns have arisen, such as expropriation, discrim-
inatory treatment and dispute settlement which in turn, require new
solutions.
The standard of national treatment forms part of the GATT
insofar as imported goods are concerned.2" In regard to foreign
investment there is no similar statement in a multilateral convention,
though a standard of equality between foreigners and nationals is
21 See E. Youngquist, United States Commercial Treaties: Their Role in Foreign
Economic Policy (1967) 2 STUDIES IN LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
72, at 8o.
-2 See R. MacDonald, The Relationship Between International Law and
Domestic Law in Canada in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ORGANIZATION (R. MacDonald, G. Morris and D. Johnston eds.
1974) 88, at 117-23.
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often contained in bilateral accords. Article IV.2 of the Agreement
provides as follows:
Subject to their respective laws, regulations and other related direc-
tives governing foreign investment and to international agreements
and arrangements, the Contracting Parties undertake to maintain a
mutually beneficial investment climate and recognize the importance
of according fair and equitable treatment to individuals and enter-
prises of the member countries of ASEAN and Canada, including
treatment with respect to investments, taxation, repatriation of
profits and capital. 24
This hardly amounts to a guarantee of national treatment. Existing
laws and official policies are exempted and the standard of treat-
ment is 'fair and equitable' rather than equal. There is no separate
guarantee of a right of establishment but merely a promise to
maintain a mutually beneficial investment environment.
C. THE OECD DRAFT CONVENTION
There have been other attempts to devise multilateral conventions
relating to the protection of foreign investment since the Havana
Charter, though none have proceeded beyond the draft stage. In
1962 the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) adopted a Draft Convention on the Protection of
Foreign Property. 5 Article 3 of the OECD Draft states that expro-
priatory measures may be taken in the public interest and under due
process of law. The Draft then provides for compensation which
represents the genuine value of the expropriated property. Canada
is a member of the OECD but none of the ASEAN countries are.
The above standard may be seen as biased in favour of the indus-
trialized capital-exporting countries which make up most of the
OECD membership. The OECD Draft is innovative in that it ex-
pressly deals with "creeping expropriation" - the process by which
an investment is rendered uneconomic by discriminatory measures of
the host government that fall short of actual seizure. 6 Multilateral
attempts to deal with the protection of foreign investment have not
been, on the whole, successful - largely because the organizations
involved (like the OECD) have been seen as representing the in-
24 Supra, note 18, Article III.
25 Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property and -Resolution of
the Council of the OECD on the Draft Convention (963) ii INT'L LEGAL
MATS. 241.
26 See id., Notes and Comments to Article 3.
VOL. 19: 2
NOTES
terests of investor nations. The lack of progress, at a multilateral
level, in developing rules concerning foreign investment, has given
added significance to bilateral accords and other measures.
D. FOREIGN INVESTMENT INSURANCE
In Canada the Federal Export Development Corporation (EDC)
has, since 1969, provided insurance against various categories of
political risk in respect of investments in foreign countries." This
insurance (against expropriation, war, revolution and insurrection
and incovertibility of revenues in local currencies) is provided by
government and private insurance agencies in most developed coun-
tries."8 While this coverage is sometimes seen as a doubtful incentive
towards foreign direct investment, it does appear to offer a more
realistic alternative than diplomatic intervention.
Any person carrying on business or other activities in Canada
and who plans to invest abroad is eligible for cover: EDC regards
eligibility as extending to the significant development or expansion
of an existing foreign enterprise."0 There is no nationality require-
ment under the Canadian scheme which means that the investor
need not be a Canadian citizen or a corporation incorporated in
Canada.1
One difficulty with the present scheme is that it involves a high
level of administrative discretion on the part of EDC. As a matter
of practice EDC declines cover in certain instances though it is not
restricted from doing so by its statute."2 For example, it is a general
requirement that in order to be eligible for insurance an investment
must provide both economic benefits to Canada and the host coun-
try. 1 This has given rise to the argument, however fallacious, that
in requiring dual benefit EDC is supporting enterprises that will
compete with Canadian firms. In any event, EDC does not make
public its reasons for declining cover.
27 Export Development Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-s8, as amended.
- For a summary of national schemes, see OECD, INVESTING IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (5 th ed., I983).
29 Export Development Act, supra, note 27, S. 23 ().
30 See Foreign Investment Insurance, EDC Information Circular, No. 8o-2 (Re-
vised September 1983).
3S See T. Meron, INVESTMENT INSURANCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1976), at
121-23.
32 Supra, note 27, s. 34-
33 Supra, note 29.
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What exact risks are covered under the wording of EDC policies
is still unclear. Coverage is for risks of a political, rather than a
commercial, nature. This distinction is not always obvious, however,
as when an investor is forced into bankruptcy as a result of the host
government's mismanagement of its own economy.
The EDC policy provides for arbitration of claim disputes in
accordance with the Arbitration Act of Ontario. 4 So far there have
been no arbitrated claims concerning EDC foreign investment in-
surance. In interpreting EDC policies a Canadian arbitrator is likely
to refer to American awards concerning similar policies issued in the
United States by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation."s
Although the EDC insurance contract is subject to interpretation
according to the law of Ontario it would be unrealistic, given the
subject matter of the contract, to ignore the claims experience of
other national foreign investment insurance schemes. 6 What is ironic
about such claims disputes is that they put the source country in-
surer in the position of having to defend the maligned actions of the
host country. Though foreign investment insurance is designed to
'de-politicize' investment disputes, the findings of Canadian in-
surance arbitrators may be regarded by the host country as an
extraterritorial application of foreign law." To help overcome this
problem Canadian arbitrators should apply the provisions of inter-
national law regarding investment disputes to resolve problems of
interpretation."
tion afforded the investor by the laws of the host country. Initially,
it was mandatory before EDC could provide insurance that Canada
E. BILATERAL INVESTMENT INSURANCE AGREEMENTS
Since the introduction of EDC investment insurance there have
been several changes in EDC requirements as to the level of protec-
34 Export Development Corporation: Foreign Investment Insurance Contract,
Meron, supra, note 31, 8o9, at 83o, especially clause 25.
35 See P. Gilbert, Expropriations and the Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
tions (1977) 9 LAW & POLICY IN INT'L Bus. 515.
36 V. Koven, Expropriation and the 'Jurisprudence' of OPIC (i98I) 22 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 269.
37 This situation arose in connection with a claim OPIC allowed in respect of
an inconvertibility claim by The Foster Wheeler Corporation: see W. Adams,
The Emerging Law of Dispute Settlement Under the United States Invest-
ment Insurance Program (197) 3 LAW & POLICY IN INT'L Bus. 'ox, at x 18.
as See M. Neville, Jr., The Present Status of Compensation by Foreign Statesfor the Taking of Alien-Owned Property (ig8o) 13 VANDERBILT J. OF
TRANS. LAW 51.
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had concluded a bilateral investment guarantee agreement with the
host country.' These bilateral agreements provide for recognition by
the host state of Canada's rights as subrogee under EDC insurance
policies on which claims have been met. In addition, they set out
EDO's rights to take local currency in satisfaction of the claim of
the insured and establish a means to arbitrate disputes between
Canada and the host state "in accordance with applicable principles
and rules of public international law". 0
In 1971, following the U.S. practice, Canada dispensed with the
requirement that such agreements be a requisite in the issuance of
insurance.4" This occurred because many countries refused to sign
agreements on the ground that in doing so they inferred that they
were bad investment risks. It is now EDC policy to require that the
host country grant its approval of a particular investment. 2 Ap-
proval must take the form of an official document containing a state-
ment issued by the host government and identifying the investment
concerned. If a bilateral agreement is in place, the host government's
approval must state that the particular investment comes within the
terms of the agreement.
The bilateral investment treaty of the kind entered into by Canada
is an inadequate vehicle to deal with the numerous investment issues
that are likely to arise between any two states. Most strikingly, this
type of treaty assumes that Canada will always be the capital-
exporting source state and its partner, the capital-importing host
state. The most recent Canadian agreement, concerning foreign in-
vestment insurance with China, contains a reciprocity clause which
recognizes the possibility of Chinese investment in Canada that
might require Canadian guarantees matching those of China under
the agreement."3
9 See Exchange of Notes Between the Government of Canada and the Govern-
ment of Malaysia Constituting An Agreement Relating to Canadian Invest-
ments in Malaysia Insured by the Government of Canada Through Its Agent,
the Export Development Corporation [1971] C.T.S. 37. Agreements are also
in force between Canada and Singapore ([x9711 C.T.S. 28), Indonesia
([1973] C.T.S. 32) and Thailand ([1983] C.T.S. 4). An agreement is
presently being negotiated with the Philippines.
40 Id., clause 6.
41 Export Development Amendment Act, 1971, 19-20 Eliz. II, C. 23, s. 9.
42 See supra, note 30.
43 Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government
of the People's Republic of China Relating to Foreign Investment Insurance,
Ottawa, 18 January 1984, clause 7-
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F. BILATERAL INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND PROTECTION
TREATIES (BITs)
As a means to resolve investment disputes, the Canadian style of
foreign investment insurance agreement is widely perceived as inade-
quate. The most useful models for a revision of the agreement are
provided by investment promotion and protection treaties to which
several Western European countries, Japan and the United States,
are now parties." BITs eschew the generality of the ASEAN Agree-
ment and seek to achieve comprehensive protection for foreign
investment by means of specific undertakings granted on a reciprocal
basis.
In recognition of the risks of "creeping expropriation" BITs are
not confined to guarantees against outright expropriatory actions but
also seek protection against any measures that significantly impair
investment rights. In the BIT between West Germany and Singa-
pore, for example, expropriation must be "for the public benefit and
against just and equitable compensation which represents the fair
market value of the investment expropriated".45 The controversial
issue of compensation for expropriation seems to be less divisive in
the context of bilateral agreements, such as BITs, than it is when
debated in a multilateral context. Most BITs provide for the free
transfer of capital and confer reciprocal most-favoured-nation and
national treatment by the host state in respect of investment activities
by nationals or corporations of the source country.
The BIT is increasingly seen as the appropriate international
means for developed countries to promote and protect investment
by their citizens in developing countries, as well as recognizing their
reciprocal obligation to accord matching guarantees in return. The
European treaties, unlike the United States model, do not go so far
as to extend a right of establishment." Given the existence of Cana-
dian laws restricting direct foreign investment in this country, it is
likely that Canada would follow European treaty practice on this
question. Canada is also, given its fondness for 'Canadian content'
44 See M. Bergman, Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties: An Examination
of the Evolution and Significance of the U.S. Prototype Treaty (1983) 16
N.Y.U. J. OF INT'L LAW AND POLITICS I.
45 See Treaty Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments Between the Federal Republic of Germany and Singapore, (1975) 1
BUNDESGESETZBLATT 49, Article 4(I).
46 Supra, note 44, at 19-20. See MODELS FOR BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON
PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS, (984) 23 INT'L LEGAL
MATS. 237.
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requirements in connection with the administration of government
economic assistance, unlikely to favour the United States' prohibition
on performance requirements (local purchasing) in connection with
investment approvals. It is interesting that in its first two BITs (with
Panama and Egypt) the United States was unsuccessful in obtaining
an unconditional right of entry included in either agreement.47
G. RESOLUTION OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
While the trend towards provision of greater legal safeguards for
investors pursuant to bilateral treaties is encouraging, it nevertheless
has limits in relation to the legal security it can afford individual
investors. Treaty obligations may not be accessible or enforceable by
individual or corporate citizens of the states concerned. A long-
standing alternative is for a private investor to seek some form of
contractual guarantee from the host state4 8 Sometimes assurances
will take the form of domestic laws or policies of the host state which
attempt to encourage and proffer protection to foreign investors.49
In connection with investments in public utilities and resource ex-
ploration, concession agreements are often entered into between
states and foreign investors.
Such preliminary arrangements offer no assurance of protection
in the event of a change of government or, more often in the case
of developing countries, a major economic crisis in the host state.
Many investors may lack confidence about resorting to courts in
foreign countries to solve legal problems relating to their invest-
ments. In routine business matters there may be no other option,
but where the matter involves activities by the host state government,
the concern about submission to local jurisdiction may be fully jus-
tified. If, as is common, an investment takes the form of a partner-
ship or joint venture agreement there will be an opportunity to
select offshore arbitration as the means to settle disputes between the
parties to the agreement. Multinational parties to a business venture
may select ad hoc or institutional means to arbitrate their disputes.
In the case of the ASEAN countries, resort may be had to the Rules
for International Commercial Arbitration of the Economic Com-
mission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) which were developed
47 See J. Pattison, The United States-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty: A
Prototype for Future Negotiation (1983) x6 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 305, at
333-34-
48 See A. Fatouros, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS (1962).
49 Kronfol, supra, note x6, at 40-45.
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in 1966 specifically for use in connection with international trade
in the region."0
It is beyond the scope of the present discussion to discuss the
efficacy of arbitration as a means to resolve foreign investment dis-
putes but reference should be made to the substantial legal difficul-
ties faced by Canadians in connection with international commercial
arbitration.5' These arise from the circumstance that arbitration law
is within provincial legislative competence under the Constitution
Act. This means that, as the law is presently understood, the Federal
Parliament is unable to implement the provisions of any interna-
tional agreement concerned with commercial arbitration which the
Government of Canada might become party to.52 Thus, Canada has
signed none of the primary international conventions on the subject.
The 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards provides a mechanism for the
recognition of awards given in the territory of members. 3 The test
of enforceability is the place where the award was made and not the
citizenship of the parties.' In the absence of a treaty, foreign awards
may only be enforced in Canada under common law principles of
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 5
A major plank in the BIT has been inclusion of specific clauses
dealing with dispute resolution. In many instances, where the dis-
pute is between an investor and a host government, reference is
made to submission to the International Centre for the Settlement
50 See Resolutions of ECAFE Conference on Commercial Arbitration (1966) 5
INT'L LEGAL MATS. 547. A regional arbitration centre has also been estab-
lished in Kuala Lumpur under the auspices of the Asia-African Legal Con-
sultative Committee. There are four Canadians on the international panel
of arbitrators maintained by the centre; see Note (1979) J. oF WORLD TRADE
LAW 88.
51 For two valuable discussions of the merits and drawbacks of international
commercial arbitration see J. Kerr., International Arbitration v. Litigation
[sg8o] J. Bus. LAW I64 and H. DeVries, International Commercial Arbi-
tration: A Contractual Substitute for National Courts (1982) 57 TULANE
L. REv. 42.
52 See J. Brierley, International Trade Arbitration: The Canadian Viewpoint,
in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION,
supra, note 22, at 826.
53 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
Done at New York, on io June 1958: See U.N. Doc. No. E/Conf.26/9
Rev. I. Of the six ASEAN countries, only Thailand, Indonesia and the
Philippines have signed the New York convention.
54 Id., Article III.
55 See W. Graham, Enforcement of Arbitration Awards, Paper presented at
Joint British Columbia-Washington Program of the Continuing Legal Edu-
cation Society of B.C. (Vancouver, 1983).
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ICSID was set up under a 1966 World Bank-sponsored Conven-
tion in accord with that organization's interest in encouraging the
flow of capital to developing countries. ICSID is not an arbitral
body in its own right, but it is designed to facilitate the establish-
ment of arbitral tribunals to resolve investment disputes between
contracting states and nationals of other contracting states. The jur-
isdiction of the Centre rests on the consent of the parties but no
party may withdraw its consent unilaterally. ICSID constitutes a
novel form of dispute resolution in addition to litigation, private
arbitration and diplomatic protection. The consent to ICSID arbi-
tration in some BITs has the effect of removing investment disputes
from the territory of either disputant and increasing the likelihood
of enforcement of any subsequent award."
VI. CONCLUSION
The ASEAN Agreement is an omnibus arrangement dealing with
political relations and development assistance, as well as trade and
investment. The above discussion has focused on foreign direct in-
vestment since that is the topic most in need of further legal develop-
ments for its continued protection and encouragement. Insofar as
investment is concerned, Canadians face two major legal disadvan-
tages over their competitors in the region - they cannot guarantee
recognition of the outcome of arbitrated investment disputes and
they lack the specific sorts of protection afforded by the more sophis-
ticated investment treaties now in wide-spread use. In this respect,
Canada could usefully emulate West Germany - which, aware of
its lack of historical relationships with developing countries, has
56 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States (1965) 4 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 524. All the ASEAN
nations except Thailand and Brunei are signatories of the ICSID Convention.
57 See Kronfol, supra, note 16, at i44-5o. The value of the ICSID system can
be illustrated with reference to Canadian experience. In 1976 the govern-
ment of Indonesia unilaterally decided to amend an oil production-sharing
contract between a subsidiary of Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting Co.,
Limited and the state-owned oil agency (Pertamina). The change resulted in
Hudson Bay being obliged to make a special payment to Pertamina as well
as increasing the profit share of the agency. The action may not be within
the cover provided for expropriatory action in the EDC investment insurance
policy. It is not known whether Hudson Bay had such insurance cover or not.
In either case, this is the type of problem well-suited to the ICSID dispute
resolution process.
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signed the largest number of modem investments treaties. Until it
is provided with such legal support, the ASEAN Agreement will be
little more than an article of faith.
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